Taiwan has a problem. The Pacific Islands within Australia's sphere of influence are a partial solution. Taiwan's problem of diplomatic isolation has been stubbornly persistent for over three decades, and involves international perceptions of its relationship to the People's Republic of China (PRC) 2 . Taiwan is recognised by only twenty-five states (six of them in Oceania 3 --Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, the Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu) and Taiwan is largely disconnected from the official global diplomatic system. This limits Taiwan's ability to present its point of view to the global media and makes it seem far less significant than it actually is 4 . Australia is one of many countries that are friendly toward Taiwan and freely trade and culturally interact with it, yet Canberra subscribes to Beijing's "one China" policy that casts doubts over Taiwan's long-term viability as an independent polity. When Taipei seeks greater security through obtaining diplomatic recognition from Pacific Islands states, Canberra may perceive it as an intruder into its own sphere of influence.
This article considers the contemporary struggle for recognition between Taiwan and the PRC in Oceania. It argues that this cannot be fully or properly understood without considering the significant role Australia plays in shaping the region, especially its large sphere of influence in the South Pacific. This became particularly clear in the Papua New Guinea crisis of 1999, which we shall consider below. Neither Biddick 5 nor Pheyey 6 considers Australia's substantial stakes in Oceania in the Taiwan-China conflict in their otherwise commendable work. This article provides both an overview of the contemporary situation and the historical development of the struggle for diplomatic recognition between Taiwan and the PRC in Oceania, as well as a unique focus on Australia's important role in this South Pacific drama. It concludes by reconceptualising these issues in terms of auctions and two influential paradigms from game theory.
Diplomatic recognition of Taiwan is less a matter of unconstrained decisions on the part of individual countries as an act of defiance of a global rule. Although this situation may change, at present the PRC has managed to institutionalise a fundamental principle which the United Nations (UN) has accepted for some time. This basic precept (despite some legalistic ambiguities and loopholes) is that there is only one China (represented by the PRC) and that Taiwan is part of it.
In 1971, as Pacific Islands independence movements were gathering momentum, the UN expelled the Republic of China (ROC) and repudiated its assertion of statehood. The ROC was not asked to reform its polity so as to be acceptable for readmission. The UN simply regarded the ROC as having come to an end. The world body declared its intention to never again address the Taiwan question, and transformed it into a domestic matter to be resolved by the PRC. In 1972 Australia reflected the general view and recognised Beijing--encouraging newly independent Pacific Islands states to do likewise.
The PRC is firmly resolved to prevent the Taiwan issue from re-emerging at the UN, where friends of Taipei such as the Solomon Islands persist in raising it--even to the point of initiating annual debates since 1993 on whether the ROC should be readmitted to the UN. Most countries (including Australia) show no interest in reopening the subject and Taiwan's bid has been blocked each year by the General Assembly's steering committee.
The matter is seen as irrelevant to most countries' foreign policy objectives. They observe the PRC's size, power and forcefulness on the Taiwan question and they see no good reason to antagonise Beijing. The strongly anti-communist kingdom of Tonga switched recognition from the ROC to the PRC in 1998 for economic reasons 7 One of Taiwan's goals is overcoming its severe diplomatic isolation. Barriers to recognition are other countries' perceptions of power in international political economy and the PRC's sense that independent statehood for Taiwan threatens to legitimate secession for non-Han areas such as Tibet, Mongolia, and Xinjiang. The power elite in the PRC feels that it must win the battle for Taiwan and its increasing uncertainty about the outcome makes it more determined 8 and it has succeeded in having most of the world organise its China policy around this.
Until it gave up all claims on the mainland in 1991 the ROC defined its competition with the PRC in these terms--claiming to represent all of China, but to be temporarily headquartered on Taiwan. Political democracy in the ROC has led to increasing demands for Taiwan's independence, with the ever-clearer message that Beijing's claims on the Islands are illegitimate. In July 1999 President Lee Teng-hui announced that relations between Taiwan and the mainland should be on a "state-to-state" basis--calling for the international community to re-examine Taiwan's status 9 . In March 2000 the presidential election was won by Chen Shui-bian, whose Democratic Progressive Party has traditionally favoured Taiwan independence, although more recently it has implied that there is no need for a formal declaration of independence. The sense of a separate national identity has been strengthening for a number of years on Taiwan 10 There is widespread apprehension that any attempt by Taiwan to turn its de facto independence into a formal legal declaration will bring military retaliation from the mainland and a grave threat to world peace 13 . Over the longer term growing class conflict, disunity and weakness on the mainland 14 or a western policy of containment toward Beijing may change this situation and strengthen Taiwan's chances of formal recognition. In the near term, Australia is concerned by any signs that the Taipei-Beijing struggle may create unwelcome disturbances within its own sphere of influence in Oceania.
AUSTRALIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE PACIFIC ISLANDS
The Australia fears that requests from Asian countries for membership in regional organisations have significant implications for the identity and the future of the region.
For many Pacific Islands countries, expanding links with Asia is a matter of urgency 18 .
The most interested Asian country is almost always Taiwan.
TAIWAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE PACIFIC ISLANDS
Oceania is an important arena for rivalry between Taipei Minister-clearing the way for the more respectable Sogavere, who, contrary to some earlier rumours, maintained diplomatic relations with Taipei. A common perception was that the Taipei-Beijing rivalry was helping outsiders to take over the political processes of the Solomons.
The situation in Nauru also illustrates the auction that is happening in Oceania. Nauru has changed its allegiance according to which state provides more money. On 21 July Harris's five-member cabinet. Nauru opened an embassy in Beijing, which was to be used by diplomatic staff affiliated with US intelligence organisations and involved in a proposed (but never completed) operation to provide Nauru passports to North Korean defectors 25 . Six months after being recognised by Nauru, the PRC was allegedly pressured to provide loans to prevent it from reverting to the ROC. Over the longer term
Beijing did not provide enough-and in May 2005 Nauru's new President Ludwig Scotty
and his government recognised Taiwan in return for the ROC keeping Air Nauru in the sky by guaranteeing payment of the outstanding debt of US$13.5m on its only jet. Since Nauru is destitute and of little strategic significance today, Australia did not actively discourage the auction.
In another Micronesian country that uses the Australian dollar as its national currency and has strong ties with Canberra, the situation was more complicated-Australia finding that its commitment to the "One China" policy prevailed over its alliance with the US. Tong's party claimed that one of the principal activities of the equatorial base was spying on the highly secretive US missile test site on Kwajalein Atoll, one thousand kilometres to the north in the Marshall Islands. Kwajalein is crucial to testing Washington's "Star Wars" missile defence system. China sees "Star Wars" as threatening its own nuclear deterrence and it has warned that it will increase its rather slight nuclear arsenal by at least ten times if even the most minimal version of this missile defence system is deployed. The placement of the "Star Wars" missile defence system in Taiwan could produce a major geopolitical crisis 26 . an early sign that in the future Australia will have much greater difficulty maintaining its "best of both worlds" strategy, whereby it claims that it does not have to choose between its US security ally and its increasingly indispensable PRC trading partner 29 .
In Vanuatu Australia played a leading role in supporting Beijing's objectives after Taipei made a higher bid in the local auction for diplomatic recognition. 
RENTAL AUCTIONS AND OFFSHORE BUSINESS
Taiwan and China are sometimes accused of buying friends in Oceania. In fact, Taipei and Beijing may only be renting them. In our contemporary global condition of postmodernity, with its valorisation of ephemerality 31 , there is even the possibility that
Pacific Islands countries will shift relations back and forth between the ROC and PRC to raise maximum revenues from both sides--creating concern in Canberra.
The rental of diplomatic recognition is paralleled by the global neo-liberal trend However, this narrow economistic view of the "sovereignty business" may obscure larger issues and considerations. Like the Pacific Islands country hosting an offshore financial centre (OFC) or a tax haven for foreigners 33 , the government renting recognition to Taipei or Beijing creates questions among its own "natural" citizens about their relationship to their own state and nation. Allowing foreigners to pay for benefits that are far superior to those the state extends to its own people, this erodes the legitimating doctrine of mutual obligation and popular sovereignty, which presents the state as expressing the sacred, spiritual or transcendent unity of the "people" or the "nation".
Like the OFC, the renting of diplomatic recognition strengthens an emerging utilitarian global constitutionalism-a neo-liberal world politics where the interests of investors 34 .
This weakens democracy and accountability to the people. 
RECOGNITION AUCTIONS THEORIZED
How are such auctions to be theorized? The most influential contemporary models of auctions derive from the Nobel Prize-winning work on non-cooperative games by Nash 35 , which has had a major impact on all the social sciences. His theory emphasises currently fashionable neo-liberal and individualistic assumptions about human behaviour, and its popularity has risen with the increasing salience of these ideological assumptions since the mid-1970s (especially in the English-speaking world).
Like the China-Taiwan rivalry, Nash's work arose out of the Cold War, but it did not gain immediate acceptance during the 1950s and 1960s, a "Keynesian" period when laissezfaire was generally distrusted. Nevertheless, Nash's theory has heavy Cold War This worsens the dilemma of the second-highest bidder as suspense intensifies, then slackens and, in the end, dies away. The purchaser is frequently embarrassed, having paid more than a dollar for a dollar. The second-highest bidder usually spends considerably more than a dollar to receive nothing. It is not unusual for both payments to add up to a sum of between three dollars and five dollars 41 .
Players persevere to save face and to probe their courage, reliability and perseverance in their quest to give meaning to (and get a return on) their investment. The dollar auction diplomacy of Taiwan and China in Oceania may resemble a price war, or watching a bad film, or waiting on the telephone when one is placed "on hold", or the futile US military escalation in Vietnam forty years ago-where people are locked into a self-sustaining cycle of efforts to win back or legitimate their previous losses, and in the process fall into still larger losses. Escalation of the struggle is sometimes irrational and frequently unplanned. A bidder offering large amounts of money is not always aware of the exact reason for this behaviour. Confusion and uncertainty are dominant emotions which increase as the bidding advances, so that the intentions at the conclusion of an auction can contrast sharply with those at the outset.
At the beginning bidders tend to have egocentric and short-term dispositions, and they do not consider that they and other players would offer more than a dollar for a dollar. As in price wars, participants are frequently oblivious to the effects of their own behaviour and to the fact that their own actions contribute to their predicament. These problems are even more evident among parties recognised as being antagonistic to one another (such as China and Taiwan), which come into the auction with the aim of manipulating the bidding in order to discipline each other. It is common for players to establish limits (frequently fifty cents) and to presuppose that no other bidder will move beyond that boundary. When the bids reach that frontier, some players are completely unprepared and get excited. and confused While the motives that induce the bidders to participate in the auction are numerous and diverse, as soon as they become emotionally entangled (especially as bidding nears one dollar) they confront the same predicament-to give up and lose the money that they have already committed, or to continue bidding. As soon as this happens, their original motivations change and become similar.
As the bidding nears one dollar, bidders frequently seek support from the audience and observe whether their friends are making fun of them or encouraging them. From this moment on, the onlookers are tense. The bidders' justifications for prolonging the auction can be placed in four categories, with no particular precedence in terms of their importance or temporal sequence-trying to recover money already committed to the auction; saving face through escaping the disgrace that comes from surrender; attempting to demonstrate their superiority; and imposing painful retribution on the other party which they blame for having produced the distressing dilemma in which the players are embroiled.
Bidding one dollar instantly destroys any possibility of profit for anyone. At the moment when economic success becomes impossible and players may be seen as foolish for letting their conflict get "out of hand", they are inclined to redefine the purpose of the auction as moral victory, with the quitter being the loser. Players who are mainly driven by status rivalry (rather than by monetary gain) bid a great deal more than one dollarhoping to be the last one standing and thereby gaining a Pyrrhic victory. Some bidders force losses on the other players merely to torment them. Many who offer more than a dollar say that they are pushed to do it by the other contestants' bids and that they are perplexed by their rivals' behaviour, which some of them consider to be insane. In the majority of instances players never grasp that identical pressures are impelling them and their adversaries to bid more than one dollar. Their extraordinarily egocentric perspective, above all else, blocks bidders from arriving at a broader view of their struggle, from admitting the meaninglessness of their past investments, and therefore from being capable of stopping the bid escalation without losing face 42 . Once the bids go above one dollar, players are slower in bidding, but they are inclined to escalate until they are broke 43 .
A big surge in bidding frequently contributes to ending the auction, particularly if one player increases the bid by a great sum compared with the preceding bid. This allows the other player to quit and yet save face, especially because the higher bidder must spend a lot more to finish first-creating an ultimate outcome which is closer to being equal. Big rises in bidding most often push out the adversary, but only when both players are already suffering great losses.
The escalating diplomatic competition between Taiwan and China has cost both countries a great deal of money without making either more secure. States, like human beings, sometimes fail to foresee how others will respond to their behaviour. They easily lose sight of the repercussions. In dollar auctions myopic individualism and short-term rationality impel bidders to undermine their mutual welfare and security. During a prolonged struggle the two sides may understand that neither party can win, but neither wants to quit-for fear of being imagined to be a loser. They are helplessly tied together as they proceed down a road to mutual destruction, each blaming the other, and each wanting an opportunity to start over and get out of a predicament that has become increasingly pointless and self-defeating 44 .
Shubik and Teger emphasise that a dollar auction can be converted from a noncooperative game to a cooperative game. A round of escalation is often ended by a pretext that permits one or both parties to save face. One party may unexpectedly proclaim that the true point of contention is Z-something that it realises the other party will quickly acquiesce to, since it was never really a source of disagreement. The other party will consent to Z, and the struggle will stop. In mediation or arbitration, Z is often suggested by a third party in the audience, which encourages unprecedented levels of cooperation between the two players. Z is often conceptualised as new information or an event which alters the situation and allows both parties to stop the conflict, while allowing them to maintain that their past disputes were legitimate at that time, although outmoded in the new situation 45 . In the case of China and Taiwan, Z may develop out of the end of the Cold War.
In developing the dollar auction model Shubik acknowledged his indebtedness to the game theory of von Neumann and Morgentern, who rejected Nash's theory and the individualistic ideology that it expressed 46 . The "Nash program" attempted to reduce all cooperative games into noncooperative versions, which could complement neoclassical economics. Morgenstern was an anti-neoclassical economist and von Neumann rejected Nash's theory and the very conceptual terms of neoclassical analysis. They argued that a scientific political economy would require a mathematics very different from that used by the neo-classicals 47 . They contended that that a successful solution to the problems that Nash was addressing required social cooperation 48 . In their theory, mutual advantage necessitates social communication, coalitions, explicit agreements, and acquiescence to superior, more encompassing organisations which can continually bind the parties in beneficial arrangements. The implications of their game theory were unpalatable to many Cold Warriors since it implied the need for high levels of international cooperation and even world government 49 .
CONCLUSION
The struggle between Taipei and Beijing for diplomatic recognition in the Pacific Islands is likely to be significant in shaping the future of the region 50 . In some respects, over the The rules of games can be changed. Games with new, improved and more socially beneficial rules can be developed. Antagonistic players can be redefined as cooperative.
In the interests of world peace it may be time to take the lessons of the dollar auction and 
